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Flexicurity, Casualisation and Informalisation of Global Labour 
Markets1 
 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt2 
 
 
“The fact is that these workers, indeed, are productive, as far as they increase the 
capital of their master; unproductive as to the material result of their labour. In 
fact, of course, this ‘productive’ worker cares as much about the crappy shit he 
has to make as does the capitalist himself who employs him, and who also 
couldn’t give a damn for the junk. But, looked at more precisely, it turns out in 
fact that a true definition of a productive worker consists in this: A person who 
needs and demands exactly as much as, and no more than, is required to enable 
him to gain the greatest possible benefit for his capitalist.” 
 
Karl Marx3 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper attempts to examine how global restructuring has impacted labour 
markets in the North and the South. The point of departure is that although the 
discourse on globalisation has enshrined workfare as a new socio-economic 
objective for capitalist societies, the results of this strategy have left much to be 
desired. In fact, globalisation has had a huge impact on the increase of 
unemployment and the de-regulation of labour markets which is interpreted as a 
move towards varieties of flexibility with a concomitant removal of worker 
protection, lowering of social protection and weakening of labour unions. 
Sociologically speaking this implies a loss of social cohesion and individualisation 
of human security and a collapse of stable social structures and traditional 
institutions in both North and South.  
 
What we are witnessing is a change of work arrangements in the North with an 
accompanying loss of the social relevance of the work place and of labour-based 
social organisations. Another measure is the extent of so-called “a-typical” work 
such as part time employment and fixed term contracts. The new phase in 
capitalism encapsulated in the term globalisation is associated with the rise of new 
concepts such as  ‘post-industrialisation’, ‘risk society’,  ‘network society’, and 
‘information society’ all of which draw upon the changing nature of work and 
labour markets and in some cases it has lead to degrees of flexicurity.  
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In the South casual work is the price paid for the introduction of  flexibility by the 
IFIs, TNCs and local governments. A related impact is that trade unions have lost 
bargaining power and a continuation of the neo-liberal thrust towards reduced 
protective regulation is seemingly the result. De-regulation and the withdrawal of 
the state have contributed to the creation of a new reserve-army of unemployed 
workers and a new trend towards informalisation of labour markets.  
 
The paper is divided into five parts. The first part briefly explores the impact of 
globalisation on redistribution strategies; part two takes a closer look at the 
relationship between the so-called labour market flexibility and the ‘race-to-the-
bottom’; part three is devoted to the impact of globalisation in the North; part four 
on the impact in the South. The final part looks at some instances of resistance 
against neo-liberal globalisation and concluding reflections are offered. 
 
 
Situating the shift to workfare theoretically 
 
Globalisation is currently the catchphrase of our times. In its neo-liberal 
conceptualisation as both project, process and outcome it denotes the economic 
layer of juridical and political deregulation, social flexibilisation and economic 
liberalisation. It is based on the thinking of neo-classical economic orthodoxy and 
inextricably linked to the liberalisation of commodity-, labour- and capital 
markets.4 In the neo-classical variant globalisation in the labour market is seen as 
qualitatively different from globalisation in goods/asset markets. Ideally speaking, 
according to this school of economics, the factor of production (labour services) 
crosses national boundaries embodied in individuals - denoted as international 
migration (Chiswick and Hatton 2003: 65;  Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson 2003). 
This implies that four distinctly different types of labour have emerged: manual, 
intellectual, managerial and refugee labour (Castles and Miller 1998).  
 
In reality, the neo-classical variant of globalisation creates a benign picture of the 
impact of economic liberalisation and deregulation where conflicts and 
contradictions disappear and the concomitant policy prescriptions follow natural 
laws. It represents globalisation as actively decoupling the firm from its 
relationship with state and society, rendering it ‘footloose’ and infinitely mobile. 
However, neo-liberal forms of discipline are indeed bureaucratised and 
institutionalised, and operate with different degrees of intensity across a range of 
‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres, in various state and civil society complexes (Gill 
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2003: 131). The state itself has become an active proponent of privatisation and 
deregulative measures of labour markets in the promotion of what in essence is 
capital accumulation. Furthermore, and notwithstanding its pseudo claims to 
scientific objectivity, neo-classical theory “purports to describe international 
economic relations on the basis of comparative advantage among nations endowed 
with equal bargaining power. It is a model in which the reality of profits, power 
and exploitation is expunged” (Clairmont 1996: 35). This line of thinking is based 
on an intellectual and ideological hegemony of the North and its linked intellectual 
dependency of the South (Gosovic 2000)5 with grave consequences for the 
developing countries. 
 
Globalisation has been an integral part of capitalist development since its very 
beginning. “The accumulation of capital has always been a profoundly 
geographical and spatial affair. Without the possibilities inherent in geographical 
expansion, spatial reorganization, and uneven geographical development, 
capitalism would long ago have ceased to function as a political-economic system” 
(Harvey 2000: 20, 24-25).6  This means that it can be interpreted as the 
empowerment of capital relative to labour and the intensification of social relations 
so that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away, and vice 
versa. Harvey reminds us that capitalism is under the impulsion to accelerate 
turnovertime, to speed up the circulation of capital, and, consequently to 
revolutionise the time horizon of development. Secondly, capitalism is under the 
impulsion to eliminate all spatial barriers, to “annihilate space through time” as 
Marx puts it, but it can only do so through the production of fixed space. Coupled 
with the deregulation of finance, and the twin information revolution cum 
monopolisation of media power, and finally the reduction of cost and time of 
moving commodities and people or “overcoming space”, as Harvey notes, have 
altogether created immense contradictions and a potential backlash to globalisation 
which seems to be appearing in the horizon. According to these tendencies, wider 
spaces for private profit maximisation strategies are created and thus exploited by 
economic actors on a world-wide scale. It is now possible to avoid the expensive 
time-consuming regulations belonging to the shield of social protection which 
traditionally guarantees human and/or socio-economic security.  “Globalization, 
therefore, can also be interpreted as a transition into a state of less security, more 
instabilities and therefore an increased need for people to protect themselves 
against the destabilizing consequences of global processes on a local scale. Some 
actors are able to exploit the situation of insecurity for their private well-being and 
profit so that they are better off in the time of globalization than before. They 
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belong to the winners. On the other hand, there are many peoples across the world 
who belong to the exploited and therefore form the great majority of globalization 
losers. The traditional class structure and social cleavages are now reflected on a 
global scale. Globalization, therefore, means inclusion for some into the wealth- 
creating global process and exclusion of others who are not capable of 
participating in the gratifications of wealth- production” (Altvater 2004: 169-170).  
 
This perspective is grounded in a materialist international political economy 
approach but adds an ideational and relational perspective to the understanding of 
globalisation as “a set of complex, contradictory processes in which gender, race, 
ethnicity, and class play and important role” (Marchand and Runyan 2000: 11). 
Coupled to this notion, globalisation itself tends to reinforce and exacerbate 
existing inequalities, including gender, but is also embedded in a highly gendered 
and uneven discourse.  For instance, in “neo-liberal discourse on globalization, the 
state is typically “feminized” in relation to the more robust market by being 
represented as a drag on the global economy that must be subordinated and 
minimized” (Marchand and Runyan 2000: 14). 
 
Globalisation then is a process where market mechanisms increasingly transform 
various types of politically and collectively decided regulations with new ones 
catering to specific economic interests. This implies increasing levels of 
privatisation, monetary liberalisation, reductions in tariffs, labour market 
flexibilisation and fiscal discipline. The impact of these neo-liberal approaches and 
policies opens up for competition between workers and the prospects of 
‘downward levelling’ in wages and work conditions (Southall and Bezuidenhout 
2004: 128). International labour competition is not a new phenomenon but has 
changed its form and become more intensive in tandem with the 
internationalisation of capital and production. “First, international competition is 
now more direct because it occurs through actual job substitution; second, it is now 
also more extreme in that the workers involved have greater disparities in their 
wages, employment standards and political rights.” (Winthers 1996 cf Hutchison 
and Brown: 2001: 15). The point is that earlier while competition between workers 
in the North saw labour gains through productivity-based bargaining, the latest 
version of globalisation produces a ´race to the bottom´ for wages, working 
conditions and organising capacities.  
 
With the new discourse of neo-liberalism, capitalism has been transformed from 
one of praise for the most productive period of human history to one of blaming 
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the dirigisme of both Keynesian (welfare statist) and Listian (economic nationalist) 
macro-economics (Schmidt and Hersh forthcoming). The result has been the 
dismantlement of the so-called European social model and a transformation of the 
developmental state in East Asia.  Although a convergence in social policy terms is 
emerging there are also important differences between various institutions and 
actors in the global economy as well as new types of social resistances to these 
changes. 
 
 
Labour market flexibility and the ‘race to the bottom’ 
 
In the mainstream neoclassical economic theory labour markets are universal, 
ahistorical and asocial. This is demonstrated by Fine who notes that, to be “... 
unemployed, it is necessary to acknowledge that capitalist employment is the 
predominant form taken by work or labour, that a wage system is involved. In 
other words, we need to know what is different about the labour market in 
historical and social terms as well as by comparison with other commodities that 
do not experience chronic unemployment (a term that is used with extreme 
reluctance when describing markets other than labour)” (2003: 83-84). Their 
theories promise affluence, liberation of the individual, time for leisure and joy but 
the reality proves different. One of the main proponents of neo-classical 
globalisation admits that, “...wages of low-skill workers will fall in markets that 
face cheap imports. Second, that economic insecurity will increase for almost 
everyone: As economic change speeds up, nobody has a job for life. Third, the 
patterns of existing income support and other forms of subsidy will become more 
explicit and therefore harder to sustain... Fears one through three...have some basis 
in reality” (Crook 2003: 550).  In this mode, labour becomes a commodity and less 
a production factor and in a Marxian sense both production and consumption is 
marked by alienation. Thus labour power employed by capital is the source of 
value (and surplus value) (Fine 2003: 87). The theory clearly has a strong flaw of 
ideology and other factors, euphemistically termed ‘externalities’ such as flexible 
labour markets and a constant search for increase of labour productivity. 
 
One of the buzzwords is the term flexibility which encompasses almost all spheres 
of social organisation in both North and South. “It is presented as synonymous 
with deregulatory government, lean production and the flexible firm, the 
decollectivization of industrial relations and the overall dissolution of work and 
employment into a fluid and transient form” (Amoore 2002: 23-29).7 Following 
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this thinking there are two problems in this discourse. It omits the social relations 
and masks the political power and social contests that surrounds the restructuring 
of work. It means that there is no acknowledgement of the constitution of market 
forces and technological development by the social forces engendered by the 
production process in specific places and at specific historical moments. It also 
provides a disciplinary ethos and concrete strategies for adjusting to and coping 
with globalisation. 
 
The term itself serves to constrain political and social debate about the 
restructuring of work and labour markets as it imposes the view that there is no 
alternative. The resulting impact of globalisation and flexibility is obviously that 
all social change will conform and converge. A ‘race to the bottom’ seems to be 
implied by this approach as it calls for a decrease in regulation levels of labour 
relations, but also seek to exert a downward pressure on welfare and social benefits 
that are presumed to ‘inhibit’ the incentive to work.8 
 
These contradictory processes and the downward levelling of regulations are 
closely linked to the liberalisation of international trade and integration of world 
markets. Lowering economic barriers has opened enormous opportunities for 
transnational corporations with a dramatic increase in mergers and acquisitions 
across borders rising tenfold between 1988 and 2000. Since 1998, 103 countries 
have offered concessions to foreign TNCs such as tax holidays, direct subsidies 
and special exemptions on import duties.9 This competition war to attract highly 
mobile foreign capital able to switch production easily between countries leads to a 
‘race to the bottom’ with respect to fiscality, environment and labour standards. 
 
Another feature of this evolution is the ‘feminisation of labour’ as the empirical 
evidence shows an unprecedented increase in the numbers of women workers in 
the formal and informal labour force linked to global production spheres and this 
special group is hardest hit by flexibilisation and casualisation in order to keep 
wages and labour costs down and productivity up. 
 
In addition the increase in part-time employment has gone hand in hand with 
increases in multiple jobs holding particularly for women. In the 1980s in Canada 
there was an 89% increase in female and a 28% increase in male multiple-job 
holders. This is a clear sign of a global trend towards informalisation of labour, 
lowering of wages and increasing unemployment as the most prominent outcomes 
of neo-liberal globalisation. 
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The empirical evidence for this claim is also documented in table 1 which shows 
that, “the world work force continues its upward climb. The ILOs findings indicate 
that the differentials between the world’s labour force by income and regional 
groups are widening. Percentage share of the high income group is expected to 
dive from 21% to 11 %; that of the low income group to spurt from 52% to 61%” 
(Clairmont 1996: 345). 
 
Since the 1970s, labour markets in Europe and North America have been 
characterised by high unemployment rates. New technologies encourage 
decentralised production. Increasingly, jobs are out-sourced and sub-contracted as 
companies seek greater flexibility and lower costs. Decentralised processes also 
enable firms to marginalise trade unions and neutralise labour conflicts. While 
globalisation did not create flexible work, it does contribute to its trajectory 
through market-based networks that promote a diversity of contractual 
arrangements between capital and labour. The numbers of full-time, career-seeking 
and long-term employees have fallen (Morris 2003: 7). 
 
Table 1: Growth of World Labour Force (1965-2025) 
    
 Millions of Workers  Annual Compound 
Growth rates 
     
Income Groups 1965 1995 20025 (1965-2025) 
     
World 1,329 2,476 3,656 1.7 
 (100)a (100)a (100)a  
     
High 271 382 395 0.7 
 (21) (15) (11)  
     
Middle 363 658 1.020 1.7 
 (27) (27) (28)  
     
Low 694 1,436 2,241 2.0 
 (52) (58) (61)  
     
Source: International Labour Force (Cf. Clairmont 1996: 345) 
a: Figures in brackets are percentages 
 
As revealed from table 2 global unemployment stood at 185.2 million in 2004 
adding more than 40 million without job in a decade which was supposed to have 
been the Golden Years of neo-liberal globalisation (ILO 2005: 1). 
 
Table 3 indicates that there are huge differences from the North to the South in 
terms of change in unemployment rate although Asia seems to differ from the 
 
 8 
general trend of high unemployment. ILO figures show that of the more than 2.8 
billion workers of the world half have wages below the US$2 a day poverty line. 
Among these working poor, 535 million live with their families in extreme poverty 
on less than US$1 a day (see also table 4) (ILO 2005: 2). One consequence has 
been a tremendous growth of informal and casual work.  According to ILO, the 
urban informal economy was the primary job generator during the 1990s in Latin 
America. In Africa, the informal economy generated more than 90 per cent of all 
new jobs in the region in the 1990s. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Unemployment in the world, 1994, 1999, 2001-2004 (millions) 
Year 1994 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total 140.3 170.3 174.3 180.9 185.2 184.7 
Male 82.8 99.5 102.8 107.0 110.0 109.7 
Female 57.5 70.9 71.5 73.8 75.2 75.1 
Main source: ILO, Global Employment Trends Model, 2005. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Labour Market Indicators 
 
Change in 
unemployment 
rate 
(percentage 
point) 
Unemployment rate 
(%) 
GDP growth rate 
(%) 
Employment-
to-population 
ratio 
(%) 
Annual 
labour 
force 
growth 
rate 
(%) 
Annual 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
(%) 
Region 1999-2004 1994 2003 2004 2003 2004 2005 1994 2004 1994-2004 
1994-
2004 
World 0.0 5.5 6.3 6.1 3.9 5.0 4.3 62.4 61.8 1.6 4.1 
 
Developed Economies and 
European Union 0.2 8.2 7.4 7.2 2.1 3.5 2.9 55.9 56.8 0.6 2.7 
 
Central and Eastern Europe 
(non-EU) and CIS -1.9 6.5 8.4 8.3 7.0 7.4 6.1 56.5 51.6 -0.1 1.6 
 
East Asia -0.2 2.5 3.3 3.3 7.9 8.3 6.8 78.2 76.4 1.3 8.1 
 
South East Asia and the Pacific 0.8 4.1 6.5 6.4 4.8 5.7 5.3 66.8 66.7 2.4 4.3 
 
South Asia 0.8 4.0 4.8 4.7 6.9 6.3 6.5 56.2 56.1 2.2 5.8 
 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean -0.9 7.0 9.3 8.6 1.8 4.6 3.6 55.6 56.0 2.1 2.7 
 
Middle East and North Africa -0.2 12.4 11.7 11.7 5.9 4.8 4.6 43.9 47.3 3.4 4.0 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.3 9.8 10.0 10.1 3.5 4.4 5.6 65.5 65.6 2.7 3.3 
Main source: ILO, Global Employment Trends Model, 2005. 
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Table 4: Global working poverty 1994 to 2004 
Year 
$1 WP Estimate 
(in millions) 
Share of $1 WP 
in Global Employment 
$2 WP Estimate 
(in millions) 
Share of $2 WP in 
Global Employment 
1994 611 25.3% 1′325 54.9% 
1995 621 25.4% 1′300 53.2% 
1996 551 22.2% 1′289 51.9% 
1997 569 22.5% 1′299 51.3% 
1998 581 22.6% 1′338 52.1% 
1999 569 21.8% 1′368 52.4% 
2000 561 21.1% 1′364 51.3% 
2001 563 20.8% 1′372 50.8% 
2002 561 20.4% 1′382 50.4% 
2003 550 19.7% 1′387 49.7% 
2004 535 18.8% 1′382 48.7% 
Source: Kapsos, S, “Estimating growth requirements for reducing working poverty: Can the world halve working 
poverty by 1015” Employment Strategy Paper no. 2004/14 (Geneva, 2004). 
 
In the last 25 years in Europe and North America there has been a rise in non-
traditional work arrangements i.e. increases in the proportion of the labour force 
employed part-time, in shift work, self-employment, and in the proportion of 
workers holding multiple jobs and casual/temporary jobs. These non-traditional 
labour arrangements are also evident throughout the economies of most developing 
nations, but “... half the planet’s labour force (1995) live in poor countries where 
per capita income is below $700. These are official numbers that deliberately 
circumvent the quasi-slave labour of tens of millions of children that are 
deliberately unrecorded as in Bangladesh and Pakistan - votaries of the Free 
World” (Clairmont 1996: 345). Today, it is evident that of the over 2.8 billion 
workers in the world, nearly half still do not earn enough to lift themselves and 
their families above the US$2 a day poverty line. Among these working poor, 535 
million live with their families in extreme poverty on less than US$1 a day (ILO 
2005: 2). This is also illustrated by the growing inequalities between the North and 
the South: “The income gap between the fifth of the world’s people living in the 
richest countries and the fifth in the poorest was 74 to 1 in 1997, up from 60 to 1 in 
1990 and 30 to 1 in 1960” (UNDP 1999: 3). 
 
Nevertheless, it is not possible to conceive of globalisation as a one-way, 
inexorable path towards economic integration and a global labour market. 
Economic forces do not autonomously impact “institutions and markets in an 
unmediated fashion, abstracted from the social and political setting in which they 
are embedded. Indeed, uneven development of globalisation is to be expected and 
whether there is levelling up or down in specific regional integration exercises, for 
example, will depend on the balance of social and political forces involved” 
(Munck 2004: 4). What this implies is the fact that, the size of the economy matters 
as well as the strength of the state and the ability of working classes and national 
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economic forces to resist external and domestic policies of neo-liberal 
globalisation. 
 
This seems to imply that there are differences between North and South as well as 
important variations between how big and small economies and there concomitant 
state-society complexes are configured in their ability to develop pro-active as well 
as re-active responses to the challenges from neo-liberal globalisation. 
 
 
From flexicurity to insecurity in the North 
 
The most dramatic change in labour markets as an effect of globalisation has been 
the growth of insecurity understood as fear of job loss. “One concept which has 
become increasingly popular among policy-makers is ‘employability’: the 
argument is that individuals can no longer anticipate unbroken employment within 
a single organisation but can avoid labour market vulnerability by acquiring valued 
competences, including adaptability itself. This is the basis on which the European 
Commission (1997) envisages a ‘balance’ between flexibility and security” 
(Hyman 2004: 25; also EU Commission 1997 cf Hyman). This is denoted by the 
term ‘flexicurity’. 
 
The idea about flexicurity is derived from the Dutch labour market debate and has 
become the new overall policy of the European Union in its attempt to distance 
itself from the US It can be defined as: “a policy strategy that attempts, 
synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour 
markets, the work organisation and labour relations on the one hand, and to 
enhance security – employment security and social security – notably for weaker 
groups in and outside the labour market on the other hand” (Wilthagen and 
Rogowski, 2002: 250). This cause has been relatively successful in the 
Scandinavian economies and to some degree in the Netherlands. In the rest of the 
EU it has not achieved the same success because of a variety of reasons such as 
emphasis on Fordist or industrial types of flexibility and income security. 
 
By blaming the victims this rhetoric in fact,  is no more than a means of 
individualising the problem of unemployment and deficient job opportunities and 
scapegoating the unemployed for their own marginalisation; or as Lowe (1998: 
248) puts it, “the concept of ‘life-long learning’ is shifting the onus of human 
resource development onto the individual”.  
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A purely supply-side labour market policy aimed at increasing individual 
“employability” is likely to result primarily in a more qualified cohort of 
unemployed; a frustrating mismatch between enhanced skills and the limited skill 
content of available jobs (particularly in the expanding service sector); and perhaps 
also in a demographic shift in the structure of employment and unemployment. 
However, the concept of employability is in principle one which can be made 
appealing to trade union policy. This would imply the coordination and integration 
of demands which unions have indeed often embraced: first, for enhanced 
individual entitlements to education and training, and for flexible opportunities to 
benefit from these throughout the working life of individuals; second, for more 
effective (and worker-oriented) provision both by employers and by education and 
training institutions; third, for demand-side policies to encourage employment 
growth and, no less importantly, to provide appropriate employment opportunities 
for “up-skilled” workers. As Lowe argues (1998: 249), “job quality could be a 
basis for collective action, especially among well-educated young workers whose 
expectations are still high”.  
 
The policy strategy of flexicurity thus has limited relevance in small parts of 
Europe only. In particular because the social wage is being eroded everywhere and 
regular employment is increasingly treated as a luxury that cannot be afforded. 
 
Turning to the U.S.,  “…. real wages are below their level of 1973...” (Bienefeld 
2000:48). Estimates from 2001 showed that one-third of all US workers are 
identified as contingent workers and this appear to be a conservative estimate 
(Parker 2002: 109).  Conventional fixed term employment, in manufacturing and 
services, is being swiftly replaced by part-time, low paid, non-unionised labour. In 
the USA, unionised labour in manufacturing fell from 42% in 1950 to less than 
14% in 1994 (Clairmont 1996: 45). The empirical evidence shows that employers 
have increasingly turned to contingent workers to smash unions, cut labour costs, 
gain greater control over the labour process, and increase their profits as was done 
in earlier phases of industrial capitalism. 
 
Since the 1980s labour markets in the US have been characterised by falling wages 
and growing inequalities while Europe has been cast in a high structural long-term 
unemployment, both for the lowest deciles of the labour market (Cuyvers and 
Glenn Rayp 2001). These trends have emerged as a result of the transfer of 
production and manufacturing to low-wage countries like India, China, Brazil and 
Third World countries. There has been a proportionate decline in the US 
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manufacturing workforce with dramatic impacts for the de-industrialisation of the 
US war economy and increasing unemployment in the goods-producing and 
manufacturing sectors. The “lucky” laid-off workers have been able to obtain 
employment in the low-paid service sector which increased, relative to the total 
labour force, from 66.7 percent in 1970 to 80.5 percent in 2000 (Berberoglu 2003: 
101).  
 
What we are witnessing is jobless growth in the North (US, Japan and Europe) that 
is economic growth rates with growing unemployment. With the predominance of 
financial capital and a permanent stage of surplus production the manufacturing 
sector cannot find new outlets for its production. “Only a minute fraction of all 
industrial jobs were generated within the TNC manufacturing sector, a job sector 
that is being rapidly degutted. Over the past decade, the world’s Top 500 
corporations shed over 400,000 workers yearly. There are no signs of a turning 
point as any casual perusal of the financial press would confirm. Job exterminism 
continues to move in concert with TNC expansion” (Clairmont 1996: 45).  
 
It seems that the European model of social capitalism increasingly is converging 
with the American model of market fundamentalism. Proponents of the neo-liberal 
discourse claim that in the long run the benefits of globalisation will eventually 
trickle down but unfortunately in the long run we are all dead, as Keynes said. 
 
 
Deregulation, casualisation and informalisation of work in the South 
 
When discussing the situation in the Third World it is unavoidable to include the 
role of the IMF and the World Bank. The Fund attached more than fifty structural 
policy conditions to the typical three-year loan disbursed through its Extended 
Fund Facility in the 1990s and nine to fifteen structural conditions to its typical 
one-year standby arrangement. Their scale and scope were unlike anything in the 
institution’s prior history. The IMF moved into areas like corporate behaviour, 
accounting methods and principles, attacks on corruption, promotion of good 
governance etc. (Eichengreen & James 2003: 535). These interventions have had a 
huge impact on labour market policies in the developing countries and have been a 
direct cause for the increases in unemployment and informalisation of labour. This 
has lead the Bank to claim that: “Governments and workers are adjusting to a 
changing world. The legacy of the past can make change difficult or frightening. 
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Yet realization of a new world of work... is fundamentally a question of sound 
choices in the international and the domestic realm” (World Bank 1995: 11). 
 
The aftermath of the East Asian crisis in 1997 offers an illustration of the 
ideological blindfold  by the ‘Washington consensus’ when it contended that, “East 
Asian labour markets are fairly flexible, with fewer institutional or policy-driven 
rigidities than European or Latin American markets - minimum wage policies are 
limited, wage-setting practices are flexible, and wages and productivity growth are 
closely linked. As a result, fewer sharp contrasts existed between formal, 
privileged workers and rural, informal workers” (World Bank 1998 cf De Meyer 
2001:161). The reality is that not only were the IMF and the World Bank 
responsible for the outset of the crisis by pressurising for the encouragement of 
speculative capital through account liberalisation from the constraints of previous 
regulation, but the draconian crisis management programs and conditionalities 
resulted in the ultimately negative growth rates and record unemployment rates in 
1998, with “over 1 million people in Thailand and 21 million in Indonesia fell 
below the poverty line...” (Bello 2002: 66-67). When Asian governments were 
forced to accept financial relief coordinated by the IMF, Washington imposed 
conditions that clearly targeted ordinary workers. “A standard message was to 
increase labour market flexibility, and the not-so-subtle subtext was to lower 
wages and lay off workers,” as Stiglitz asserted. He also stressed that: “In East 
Asia, it was reckless lending by international banks and other financial institutions, 
combined with reckless borrowing by domestic financial institutions . . . which 
may have precipitated the crisis. But the costs, in terms of soaring unemployment 
and plummeting wages, were borne by the workers” (cf. Aslam 2000). Flexibility 
can be seen as a response to globalisation which increases competition but at the 
same time it is clear from the empirical evidence that in East Asia it has been 
accompanied by weakened trade unions and an authoritarian political system. 
 
The same trends can be seen in China where the government is promoting a high-
speed, export-led growth model highly dependent on foreign direct investment. 
China has become the largest recipient of FDI in the world, and the government 
has actively courted that investment with tax benefits, infrastructure, and highly 
repressive and exploitative labour conditions. TNCs now account for more than 45 
percent share of industrial output, greater than the 30 percent share of state firms 
This investment has been largely diverted from other peripheral countries, 
especially in East Asia, that had previously depended on it to power their own 
export growth. China's success in attracting FDI and exporting manufactures thus 
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poses a serious competitive threat to these other peripheral countries. It is tied, for 
example, to growing economic strains and instabilities in South Korea and Mexico 
(Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005). However, China is losing more manufacturing 
jobs than the United States. For the entire economy between 1995 and 2002, China 
lost 15 million manufacturing jobs, compared with 2 million in the US, The 
entrance of China as major exporter based on increasingly flexible labour-market 
policies has been accompanied by a tremendous growth in the informalisation of 
labour accompanied by petty crime, prostitution and menial labour. Urban 
joblessness, unheard of when the Maoist government provided cradle-to-grave 
employment, now averages around 8-9%, according to scholars at the Beijing-
based Development Research Center (DRC), a government think tank. (The 
official rate, by contrast, is a rosy 3.6%.) Joblessness is much higher, perhaps 20%, 
in industrial rust belts that cut great swaths across the north, where outmoded, 
bankrupt factories are being shut down and communist-era work units eliminated 
at a breathtaking pace. Reliable numbers aren't available, but some estimate there 
are at least 19 million Chinese who are out of work; tens of millions more are 
unaccounted for by Labour Department statisticians.  
 
The entrance of China as a major player has also had grave consequences for a 
country like Mexico where a similar situation as the one in East Asia can be 
observed. In the aftermath of the Peso crisis and buoyed by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico in the 1990s was the bustling factory 
floor of the Americas. But since 2000, as China rose to assume that role, more than 
270,000 Mexicans have lost assembly jobs, hundreds of factories have closed their 
doors, and Mexico's trade deficit with China has grown to more than $5 billion. 
The ubiquitous "Made in China" stamp, found on everything from toys to textiles 
to statues of Our Lady of Guadalupe, has become the incarnation of the single 
greatest perceived threat to Mexico’s economic prosperity and a symbol of the 
pitfalls of globalisation (Farrell, Puron and Remes 2005). Chinas rise to 
prominence in the global economy has also affected internal developments in the 
Third World. 
 
The Asian, African and Latin American situations indicate a worsening in 
unemployment and labour market conditions. In addition, unemployment rates in 
many countries mask widespread underemployment. The working poor are largely 
invisible in official statistics. Billions of women and men do not have work that 
taps their individual creativity and utilises their productive potential. For the most 
part women’s work remains undervalued and unaccounted for. 
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The formal economy provides positive gratifications for a minority working within 
it, while the informal sector for the majority provides precarious employment and 
insecure living conditions. As noted above, in the ‘race to the bottom’ perspective 
many nations have cut back social and employment-related benefit programs while 
corporations have been cutting back on pension, health and other social insurance 
benefits. 
 
Human security - from public security to health - and food security, to education 
and shelter - is a real experience only for a minority in the developing countries. 
Informal structures and logics of individual as well as institutional and 
administrational action of citizen as well as of institutions and administrations are 
responsible for an increasing insecurity of peoples. Many of them are losing social 
security protection when they are excluded from the formal working place. Public 
security is diminishing due to the fiscal crises and then being privatised so that 
only the rich are able to buy security as a market commodity. The private supply 
on markets is only accessible for those who dispose monetary purchasing power, 
and for the great majority, informal provision of formerly public goods becomes a 
conditions of survival (Altvater 2005). 
 
Globalisation is also related to the growing importance of the informal sector and 
organised crime in providing employment opportunities. In many cases informal 
work is a survival strategy. Restructuring of formal sector enterprises in market 
economies and state-owned enterprises in transition economies has resulted in a 
proliferation of activities in the informal economy. The proportion of urban 
employment in the parallel economy is about one-third in Asia and the Pacific, 
three-fifths in Africa and two-fifths in Latin America. The ILO estimates that large 
proportions of new jobs are being created in the informal economy. Workers in 
informal activities generally face greater insecurity and have less protection than 
other workers. The unfortunate result has been the social marginalisation of 
informal workers who are generally unrecognised, unrecorded, unorganised, 
unrepresented, unregulated, unregistered and unprotected. 
 
Work in the informal economy is generally of low skill and low productivity; 
working conditions can be unsafe and unhealthy; and workers usually work long 
hours and receive low pay. Women tend to comprise between 60 and 80 per cent of 
total informal employment and are generally concentrated in a narrow range of 
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activities with lower-skill, lower-pay tasks (food processing, garment sewing and 
domestic services) (ILO 2005: 6). 
 
Work in the informal economy is also characterised by low or irregular incomes, 
long working hours, small or undefined workplaces, unsafe and unhealthy working 
conditions, and lack of access to information, markets, finance, training and 
technology. While many workers in the informal economy are visible in jobs along 
the streets of cities, towns and villages in developing countries, others work out of 
view in shops and workshops. The least visible are those who produce goods from 
their homes. 
 
The result is that while global per capita income tripled over the period 1960–94, 
there were over 100 countries in the 1990s with per capita incomes lower than in 
the 1980s, or in some cases, lower than in the 1970s and 1960s. This implies that 
the reliance on the growth of the informal sector and its concomitant illegal and 
criminal activities has an increasing impact on social and human security. 
 
 
Concluding remarks on resistance and the need for alternatives 
 
It is quite clear that the prospects of achieving full employment have permanently 
receded. Unemployment has soured everywhere even in India and China, which 
might be considered the factory floors of the world economy at the present. It is 
also evident that it is not possible for all countries to pursue the strategy of 
flexicurity as it demands an embedded social compact between labour, employees 
and the state. The developmental state in East Asia is gone, again perhaps with the 
exception of China where a developmental state with “Chinese characteristics” has 
emerged. The nature of work has changed tremendously to a greater level of 
informalisation and the reliance on casual labour has increased in both South and 
North. Indeed we can observe a trend towards Thirdworldisation of labour markets 
in the North, especially in the United States. 
 
In a more strategic perspective this implies that capital has gone global while 
labour organisation remains national. One reason is that trade unionism is no 
longer a struggle with capital but a trench war against the tax-payer probably 
because the public sector is easier terrain for trade union recruitment and the 
concomitant difficulties to organise workers in trade unions exposed to 
globalisation. Also in Eastern Europe, South Africa, India and Brazil organised 
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trade unionism has become weaker, divided, and reduced to confrontational 
politics (MacShane 2004;  Munck 2004), but with important exceptions. 
 
As Bienefeld notes “competitive market forces are amoral, unsentimental and 
enormously powerful. In arms length markets, goods and services compete without 
reference to the social or human conditions of their production. In the process, they 
become commodities; socially disengaged use values. And, when their appearance 
and their performance characteristics (their “use values”) are equivalent, the 
cheapest ones survive. The question of whether the lowest price was made possible 
by superior organization, by better technology or by the intense exploitation of 
labour is of no concern to the market, unless people, acting through a political 
process, make it so” (2000: 46-47). Work force growth and TNCs labour 
demolition strategies, “to remain internationally competitive” to use their 
pedestrian refurbished rationalisation, will augment joblessness with further 
soaring inequalities as their concomitant (Clairmont 1996: 346).  
 
The issue is what Ankie Hoogvelt (1997: 113) convincingly argues that there is a 
historical trend towards forms of production organisation in which capital no 
longer needs to pay for the reproduction of labour power. At the same time, 
participation in the global marketplace means that the domestic market is no longer 
needed to serve the self-expansion of capital. Jobless growth is what the present 
phase of capitalism is all about. “It is this process of globalization rather than any 
claimed imbalance in the national accounts between public and private sector 
growth (the fiscal deficit), nor any demographic imbalance (the greying 
population) that is the main reason for the perceived need to shed and restructure 
the welfare state which has become the dominant political project in all advanced 
countries since the 1980s” (Hoogvelt ibid).  Coupled with the fact that there is a 
‘race to the bottom’ in terms of job flight and a competition of lowering standards, 
regulations and laws it is interesting to see the responses from labour in the North 
which in most cases have relied on a defensive and sometimes protectionist 
strategy. As mentioned at a recent conference for East Asian union leaders hosted 
by the AFL-CIO: “As soon as we start to organize a union, the company threatens 
to move to Vietnam,” and it was an unanimous view at the conference that 
international regulations are needed to keep companies from moving to low-wage 
economies (Los Angeles Times February 22, 1998). 
 
The question is what types of resistance are reliable and which are unsustainable in 
both a short-term and longer term perspective. 
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Ellen Meiksin Woods criticises those anti-capitalists who focus on TNCs and 
international agencies. She points out that many of the arguments used against 
these organisations are not anti-capitalist, but anti-global. The real issue is that, 
globalisation is a consequence of capitalism, not a cause of exploitation. Instead 
Wood forcefully argues that nation states are still the most reliable guarantors of 
capital accumulation, and therefore states should remain the focus of opposition 
movements. She is correct when she argues that:  “While we can imagine capital 
continuing its daily operations with barely a hiccup if the WTO were destroyed, it 
is inconceivable that those operations would long survive the destruction of the 
local state.” And “...capitalism whether national or global, is driven by certain 
systemic imperatives of competition, profit maximization and accumulation, which 
inevitably require putting ‘exchange values’ above ‘ use values’ and profit above 
people.” The point is that, the capitalist state has always performed a very 
important function: “controlling the mobility of labour, while preserving capital’s 
freedom of movement” (Wood 2003: 134, 131, 133). 
 
Globalisation can not create prosperity for all only the illusion of it. Globalisation 
per se is not a new phenomenon but rather a rhetoric invoked by governments in 
the North in order to justify their voluntary surrender to the financial markets.... 
“far from being — as we are constantly told--- the inevitable result of the growth 
of foreign trade, deindustrialization, growing inequality and the retrenchment of 
social policies are the result of domestic political decisions that reflect the tipping 
of the balance of class forces in favour of the owners of capital.” (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 2001; Hersh 2004). This is why, there are increasing signs of popular 
and workers organised resistance against the impact of globalisation and also why 
even the global pundit among newspapers International Herald Tribune foresaw 
“...a revolt against the idea that labour, rather than investors or management, 
should pay the cost of corporate globalization” (Pfaff 1997). 
 
It is not a coincidence that the most outspoken and militant movements against 
globalization to some degree are strong and well-organised in the semi-peripheral 
catching-up economies such as South Africa, South Korea and Brazil. One of the 
key conditionalities from the IFIs including the OECD is that these countries must 
have more flexible labour markets - which usually denote labour forces that are ill-
paid and docile, but this discourse has been met with fierce resistance though with 
mixed results.  
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In post-apartheid South Africa, ANC has embraced neo-liberal policies to such a 
degree that the trade union movement had to develop a strategy of how to cope 
with the various impacts of globalisation in the labour market. This has been done 
through various confrontations with TNCs, and by mobilising support from 
international labour networks (Southall and Bezuidenhout 2004: 144).  Since 1994, 
neo-liberal economic policies have massively increased job losses and generated a 
widening gap between white and black, and rich and poor. “The share of the 
poorest two-thirds in the country has dropped about 15 percent. The average 
income of African households fell around 19 percent while the average white 
household rose 15 percent. Unemployment doubled - South Africa now has around 
eight million unemployed” (Coetze (2004: 103). This is equal to 40 percent of the 
workforce - a number which unions call the ‘jobs bloodbath’.  
 
In Latin America labour and social movement’s number of protests and conflicts 
against the ‘Washington Consensus’ and local government’s implementation of 
neo-liberal policies increased from 2000-2002 over the first annual period by 180 
percent and by 11 percent for the second. “This deepening of social conflict was 
the expression of a double crisis challenging the neo-liberal regime: economic 
crisis, caused by a recession that appeared to be spreading at both regional and 
international level; and a crisis of legitimacy that it seemed to have imposed 
successfully in the first half of the decade” (Algranati, Seoane and Taddei 2004: 
112). The deepening of the recession and economic instability has dealt a severe 
blow to the political and ideological legitimacy neo-liberalism has enjoyed in 
previous decades.  In Brazil, the new government of President Lula which was 
elected in 2003 launched a provisional reform which triggered the first national-
level labour conflict. Some 400,000 state employees participated in a strike 
convened by the CUT. In the end, the strike led to a debate inside the Workers 
Party and various social movements about the direction of a government elected to 
redistribute wealth and benefit the most oppressed social sectors in Brazil 
(Algranati, Seoane and Taddei 2004: 128). 
 
What these examples show, in a Polaynian double-movement perspective, is that 
the will and strength of workers organisation to increase their share in company 
profits and the aim to confront the state toward re-collectivisation of social welfare 
and redistributional policies is one possible outcome. There are other signs, in 
Europe for instance, where a strong leftist movement in France voted against the 
neo-liberal EU constitution. Another possible outcome, on a more pessimistic note, 
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is a return to more authoritarian forms of labour market regulation as a natural 
outcome of neo-liberal globalisation. 
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1  Paper to be presented at the XXV Congreso De La Asociación Latinoamericana De 
Sociologia, “Desarrrollo, Crisis Y Democracia en America Latina: Participation, 
Movimientos Sociales Y Teoria Sociológica”,  22-26 August, 2005 in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil.   
 
2  Associate Professor, Research Center on Development and International Relations, 
Fibigerstraede 2, Aalborg University, 9220 Aalborg, Denmark 
 
3  Grundrisse, 1973, Penguin, New York, pp. 273. 
 
4  Neo-liberalism emerged out of an “unholy alliance” between neoclassical economics, 
which provided most of the analytical tools, and what may be called the Austrian-
Libertarian tradition, which provided the underlying political and moral philosophy. It is 
an “unholy alliance”, because the gap between these two intellectual traditions is not a 
minor one, as those who are familiar with, for example, Hayek’s scathing criticism of 
neoclassical economics would know (See Chan 2001: 1). It is also interesting to note that 
it was in a Latin American economy, Chile it was implemented the first time under the 
dictatorship of Augosto Pinochet. 
 
5  This hegemony is closely related to the launch of other imperatives and co-optations of 
words such as “the end of conflict”, “the end of Class struggle”, “the end of ideology”, 
“partnerhsip”, “stakeholders” and so on. Gosovic (2000). 
6 For this and the following, see Harvey (2000). 
7 For this and the following, see Amoore (2002). 
8 The term ‘race to the bottom’ reflects the notion that global economic competition 
encourages deregulation. This causes the state to lose its redistribution role and its 
capacity to offer services to citizens, since taxation revenues would decline. In short, the 
governments with the lowest standards and income taxes would emerge as the winners, 
since they would be the ones attracting companies to set up operations in their territory, 
see Brawley (2003: 59). 
9 For this and the following, see Morris (2003). 
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